

Collusion and Horizontal Agreements

What is collusion?

- Agreements on sale prices
- Quota allocation
- Market segmentation

- Explicit collusion
- Tacit collusion

- Definition:
 - “Situation in which prices are higher than some benchmark”

Colluder Problems

- Example
- Temptation to deviate
- Therefore participants need....
 - Ability to detect
 - Possibility of punishment
- Comparison between short-term deviating gains with long-term collusive gains
- Where should we coordinate?

When is collusion more likely?

- Incentive constraint
- Collusion is more likely to arise when...
 - Lower immediate gains
 - Lower profits after punishment starts
 - More weight to the future
- Factors relax or tighten incentive constraint

Factors (1)

- Concentration
- Entry (and entry barriers)
- Cross-ownership and other links among competitors
- Regularity and frequency of orders
- Buyer power

Factors (2)

- Demand elasticity
- Product homogeneity
- Symmetry
- Multi-market contacts
- Price observability

Collusion in Practice

- Difficult to infer from market prices:
 - Limited available data
 - Difficult to define monopoly price
 - How high is “too high”?
 - High prices may reflect high willingness to pay
- Evolution of prices?
- Soda-Ash case

What should be illegal?

- Explicit agreements
- Hard evidence
- Avoid exchange of price and quantity info

- Can we avoid tacit collusion?
 - Difficult to enforce
 - Need to coordinate leads to communication

Policies against tacit collusion

- Ex-ante policies:
 - High expected fines
 - Black list of facilitating practices
 - Merger analysis
- Ex-post policies:
 - Surprise inspections
 - Leniency programs

Joint ventures

- Example: research joint venture
- Similar to merger analysis: market power versus efficiency
- Research joint ventures:
 - Spillovers and non-rivalry
 - Avoid cost duplication
 - Lenient treatment in competition law