# Corporate Finance

# Lecture 8: Taxes and Bankruptcy and the Modigliani and Miller Theorem

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### Aside: Valuing Perpetuities

A perpetuity is a constant level cash flow that continues forever.

(it turns out that a project/firm with *indefinite* life is valued with the same technique as a project/firm with truly *infinite* life)

#### Examples:

- i) Firms
- ii) Consol Bonds
- iii) Preferred Stock
- iv) Some specific Projects (e.g. rental arrangements)

Aside: Valuing Perpetuities (2)

The present value of a perpetuity is (for constant cash flows Cf and constant r):

PV(perp.) = 
$$\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \frac{Cf}{(1+r)^t} = \frac{Cf}{r}$$

Proof:

$$V = \frac{CF}{(1+r)} + \frac{CF}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{CF}{(1+r)^3} + \dots$$
  
(1+r)V = CF +  $\frac{CF}{(1+r)} + \frac{CF}{(1+r)^2} + \dots$   
subtract the first equation from the second  
rV = CF (or) V= $\frac{CF}{r}$ 

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# Corporate Taxes

- Taxes have major effect on cash flows & capital structure
- M&M: without taxes, bankruptcy, etc,. companies should be indifferent between debt and equity
- Objective: minimise taxes
- Suppose for the moment that...
  - companies are taxed (interest is tax-deductible) but...
  - investors are not (e.g. pension funds)
- In order to minimize corporate taxes...
  - Interest payments are tax-deductible while dividends are not
  - Firms prefer debt to equity

#### Corporate Taxes, Cash Flows and Value

- Assume that the firm is financed with equity and risk-free perpetuity bond (pays r<sub>D</sub> forever)
- After-(corporate) tax payments are:

$$C_{t} = (X_{t} - r_{D}D)(1 - T_{C}) + r_{D}D$$
  
=  $X_{t}(1 - T_{C}) + T_{C} r_{D}D$ 

where  $T_{\rm C}$  are the corporate taxes

- Therefore..
  - Given that the cash flow that would be achieved by an unlevered firm is X<sub>1</sub>(1-T<sub>C</sub>), X<sub>2</sub>(1-T<sub>C</sub>), X<sub>3</sub>(1-T<sub>C</sub>), and,
  - The second term of the period cash flow is constant, we have that V<sub>L</sub>=V<sub>U</sub> + T<sub>C</sub> D

### Personal Taxes

- Non tax-exempt shareholders prefer to receive income as capital gains rather than interest or dividends
- As a result,  $T_E < T_D$  on average
- Assume that all shareholders have identical tax rates

Personal and Corporate Taxes and Value

After-tax payments are:  $C_{t} = (X_{t} - r_{D}D)(1 - T_{C})(1 - T_{F}) + r_{D}D(1 - T_{D})$ or  $C_{t} = X_{t}(1 - T_{c}) (1 - T_{F}) + r_{D}D[(1 - T_{D}) - (1 - T_{c}) (1 - T_{F})]$ The present value of the second summand perpetual stream is T<sub>a</sub>D where  $T_a = 1 - [(1 - T_C) (1 - T_E)/(1 - T_D)]$ Therefore,  $V_L = V_U + T_a D$ 

# Bankruptcy costs

- Important only if bankruptcy (or the threat of bankruptcy) affects revenues or costs
- Classification:
  - Direct costs: legal process of restructuring (court costs, advisory fees) (on average 2-3% of the assets)
  - Indirect costs: firms engage in operations harmful for debt holders and other stakeholders

Example: direct costs of bankruptcy

- Westlake wants to borrow \$1m for one year from a bank
- Firm has 10% of going bankrupt, in which case assets can be sold for \$600,000
- Legal costs would be \$100,000
- How much will the bank charge if it wants an average return of 10%? How much is affected by the costs of bankruptcy?

# Indirect bankruptcy costs

- Conflict of interests between debt holders and shareholders
- Managers maximise shareholder's wealth, often at the expense of debtholders and even at the expense of the value of the firm
- However, debt holders take into account this possibility when asking for a return rate and the costs are then shared

#### How equity holders can expropriate debt holder wealth

- Debt overhang problem: underinvestment, when benefits will mostly go to debt holders
- Asset substitution problem: take too much risk
- Shortsighted investment problem: tendency to take up projects that pay up early
- Reluctance to liquidate problem: keep operating even when its liquidation value exceeds its operation value