

Further References

Banks, J., and J. Sobel, "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," *Econometrica* 55(3), May 1987, 647-661.

Cho, I-K, and D. Kreps, "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 102(2), May 1987, 179-221.

Crawford, V., and J. Sobel, "Strategic Information Transmission," *Econometrica* 50, 1982, 1431-1451.

Kihlstrom, R., and M. Riordan, "Advertising as a Signal," *Journal of Political Economy* 92, June 1984, 427-450.

Kreps, D., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson, "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," *Journal of Economic Theory* 27, 1982, 245-52.

Kreps, D. and R. Wilson, "Sequential Equilibrium," *Econometrica* 50, 1982, 863-94.

Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts, "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information," *Econometrica* 50, March 1982, 443-460.

Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts, "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," *Journal of Economic Theory* 27, August 1982, 288-312.

Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts, "Prices and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," *Journal of Political Economy*, 94, August 1986, 796-821.

Selten, R., "Re-examination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games," *International Journal of Game Theory* 4, 1975, 25-55.